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Abstract 
 
I have analyzed the evolution of forward guidance from calendar to state-based, the practicality of the Evan’s Rule and                   
possible ways to reform it. The Evan’s Rule prescribes that the liftoff of the federal funds rate from the zero lower bound                      
(ZLB) until the unemployment rate and/or the PCE inflation rate thresholds are breached. In the process, I examined the                   
biases, measurement errors, and other limitations extant in the labor utilization and inflation variables, and reviewed the                 
literature on methods to improve forward guidance, particularly when the federal funds rate is at ZLB. Using time-series                  
analysis after testing for stationarity and cointegration, I calibrated the thresholds of ECI wage growth and the−                 
employment-to-population ratio and investigated the relationship between other labor utilization variables. Then I             
imposed various supply, demand and monetary shocks and constructed impulse response functions to contrast the paths of                 
eight macroeconomic variables including the federal funds rate, 10-year treasury yield, GDP growth rate under three                
scenarios consensus baseline, current Evan’s Rule and the new ECI wage rate threshold. The results suggest that under−                  
the wage growth rate scenario, the federal funds rate lift off earlier than under the current Evan’s Rule, indicating a                    
tightening of the monetary policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ​I gratefully acknowledge the advice from Skanda Amarnath, the Director of Research and Analysis at Employ America, 
throughout this project. All errors (if any) are my own. For discussion, feedback or comments, please email me at 
joshi@employamerica.org​.  
Introduction 
 
In this research paper, I have empirically examined the feasibility of state-based forward guidance in the US, specifically                  
the role of Evan’s Rule in shaping the economy, and constructed FRB/US simulations to explore alternative ways the                  
FOMC can employ to enhance state-based forward guidance. The FOMC employs the unconventional monetary policy               
tool of forward guidance so that the public can understand the expected path of interest rates. Particularly at the Zero                    
Lower Bound (ZLB), it amplifies monetary policy accommodation. By assuring the financial markets and the public, it                 
reduces the uncertainty about future policy. ​Forward guidance and large scale asset purchases (first introduced on                
November 25, 2008) impose downward pressure on the long term yields. Whilst large scale asset purchases (LSAPs)                 
reduce the term premium part of the long term yields, forward guidance lowers the investors’ future expectations of                  
short-run yields.  
 
On December 12, 2012, when the FOMC extended to purchase longer-term assets under LSAP3, it switched its forward                  
guidance formulation from calendar dates to threshold-based or state-contingent forward guidance. It linked the forward               
guidance on policy rates directly to its economic objectives. Unlike in its previous post-meeting statements wherein it                 
declared to keep the federal funds rate low at least until a specific year, now the FOMC introduced thresholds of                    
unemployment and the projected PCE inflation rate (one to two years from the present) at 6.5 and 2.5 percent,                   
respectively, that is the foundation of the Evan’s Rule. However, breaching these thresholds would not automatically                
signal an increase from the current level of the rates held at 0 to 25 bps. Further, it clarified that the rise of the federal                         
funds rate from the ZLB is not entirely contingent upon crossing the thresholds as long term inflation expectations have to                    
be well-anchored. Moreover, the guidance was based on thresholds, not triggers. Upon crossing the threshold, the                
members of the FOMC would consider a range of other variables that affect the health of the labor market to check if                      
policy rate hikes are warranted.  
 
The structure of the research paper is as follows. First, I’ve reviewed the literature on forward guidance, then discussed                   
the deficiencies of adopting the Evan’s Rule with the unemployment and inflation rate thresholds of 6.5 and 2.5 percent,                   
respectively. Focusing on the time period 2012-2017 when the FOMC had established the Evan’s Rule as a framework to                   
conduct forward guidance, I calibrated the threshold values of employment to population ratio and ECI wage rate, which                  
are comparable to the 6.5 percent unemployment rate, and 2.5 percent PCE inflation rate. Using the threshold value of                   
wage growth, I simulated the impact of supply, demand and monetary shocks on macroeconomic variables under two                 
scenarios first, in which the FOMC adheres to the currently established Evan’s Rule, and, second, in which it keeps the −                    
unemployment rate threshold at 6.5 percent, but replaces the PCE inflation rate with the ECI wage growth of 3.5 percent.                    
Additionally, I have constructed the aforementioned simulations for the years 2020-Q2 to 2023-Q4. Besides the               
thresholds, I’ve altered the parameters in the optimal control policy and the Taylor rule monetary policy reaction function                  
to gauge if changing weights on output and inflation gap impact the timing of the liftoff of the federal funds rate from the                       
zero lower bound (ZLB).  
Literature Review 
 
Raskin (2013) evaluated the effects of calendar-based forward guidance and discerned the degree to which it changed the                  
public's opinions on the FOMC’s monetary policy reaction function. He used estimates that measure how sensitive the                 
money market futures rate are to surprises in the macroeconomic data. Albeit, the ZLB on the nominal interest rates                   
complicates the process in addressing the above question, he overcame the problem by constructing risk-neutral               
probability density functions of the public’s expectations on the short-term interest rates, which are derived from interest                 
rates options. The empirical model comprises dummy variables to reflect the impact of the extension of calendar-based                 
forward guidance, keeping other factors constant. These factors are volatility in the monetary policy and business cycle                 
which vary over time when shocks hit the economy. The point estimates from the regression models signal that the phrase                    
“mid-2013”  curtailed how sensitive the expectations were by 75 to 100 percent. 
 
In August 2011, when the FOMC revised its guidance to keep the federal funds rate low “at least through mid-2013,”                    
investors lowered their expectations on the future federal funds rate target for the next couple of years, declining the                   
money market futures rates. However, the announcement diminished the uncertainty surrounding its path as the implied                
volatility on options considerably declined. He ascribed this to the increasing probability of ZLB being a binding                 
constraint in the future. He found that the calendar-based forward guidance in August 2011 led to a statistically significant                   
change in the market’s perceptions of the reaction function. Consequently, the risk-neutral percentiles became less               
sensitive to economic shocks. Yet, the FOMC’s statement to extend the lowering of the policy rates from “mid-2013” to                   
“late-2014” in January 2012 had no statistically significant effect as the market participants had previously anticipated the                 
FOMC to extend the guidance. As the short-term interest rate expectations became less sensitive, the long-term rates                 
became anchored at lower levels. Furthermore, people’s perception of changing reaction function stimulated demand and               
pushed up consumer confidence.  
 
Distinguishing the effects of LSAPs and forward guidance is fraught with difficulty as FOMC has on several occasions                  
announced both policies simultaneously. Swanson (2017) employed the identifying assumptions in the approach followed              
by Ganurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (GSS) method to separately recognize forward guidance from the variations in the                 
federal funds rate. Then he suggested a new identifying restriction to separately identify LSAPs from the other factors.                  
The results of this strategy are robust. Finally, he inputted the options data to estimate how LSAPs and forward guidance                    
modify the uncertainty prevailing in the financial market. Swanson used high frequency regressions and found that both          −       
LSAPs and forward guidance had statistically significant effects on a diverse array of securities such as corporate bonds,                  
treasuries, exchange rates and options that measure interest rate uncertainty. Their effects are similar in magnitude to those                  
produced by the federal funds rate prior to ZLB. While forward guidance influenced short-term treasury yields more than                  
LSAPs, the latter considerably affected the long-term corporate bonds and treasury yields. The results also depicted that                 
LSAP announcements had persistent effects. Even though the impact of forward guidance was less persistent, the                
difference was statistically insignificant, probably attributed to near-term horizons of forward guidance announcements.  
 Zhang (2019) calibrated, identified, and separated the two components of the FOMC statements from 2008 to 2015 -                  
LSAPs and forward guidance. The theoretical model highlights that forward guidance announcing easing policies lowers               
the treasury yields of all maturities. This contrasts with LSAPs that reduce the long and medium-term yields and raise the                    
shortest term treasury yields due to the “feedback of the interest rate rule.” The model incorporates various channels for                   
transmitting unconventional monetary policies. Next, she aggregated the impacts of those policies adopted and              
quantitatively estimated the influence of each FOMC announcement on the real economy and the financial markets. The                 
structural model predicts various responses of the interest rates using the observed high-frequency data. Zhang built a                 
New Keynesian DSGE model and includes a nominal short-term shadow interest rate and a forward guidance shock via                  
FOMC announcements on the future policy rate rule. The model simulations work under ZLB where nominal interest                 
rates remain endogenously when the economy enters a recession. In the wake of a negative shock, the FOMC resorts to                    
forward guidance or purchases long term securities. Then she constructed impulse response functions tracking the               
movement of interest rates in the event of shocks. In decomposing the Fed’s statement into LSAPs and forward guidance,                   
she compared the predicted change in the yield curve from the linear combination of two shocks with the actual change                    
noticed in the yield curve. Then, she estimated a time series each for forward guidance and LSAP announcement and built                    
a structural model to study how persistent these monetary policy shocks were on the aggregate economy. The results                  
showcase that LSAPs were crucial in influencing output whereas forward guidance strongly affected inflation.  
 
Evans et al. (2012) examined the effectiveness of forward guidance as an unconventional monetary policy tool during the                  
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) by simple regression analyses. They also build a Chicago dynamic stochastic general                
equilibrium (DSGE) model to construct forecasts of macroeconomic variables under different policies and compare the               
simulation results with the "bright-line economic thresholds." An example of a bright-line threshold is the 7/3 rule                 
wherein the FOMC maintains an exceptionally low level of the policy rate at least as long as the medium-term inflation                    
rate is below 3 percent, and the unemployment rate is higher than 7 percent. Furthermore, they differentiated between the                   
Odyssean and Delphic communications as two ways of conducting forward guidance. In the former, the FOMC publicly                 
commits to hold the future interest rates at a particular range that deviates from the range normally suggested by the                    
underlying monetary policy reaction function. Consequently, it alters the market expectations, measured through the Blue               
Chip consensus forecasts. In the latter, the FOMC doesn’t adhere to a fixed rate and sets the policy rate prescribed by the                      
reaction function when the economic outlook changes. Typically arising during downturns, the Odyssean communications              
expose deficiencies in a Delphic structure. Resorting to outcome-based policies is paramount in such circumstances and                
policymakers may have to make hard choices to enforce less understood and unconventional tools to achieve their                 
mandated goals. The FOMC relies on Delphic communication to policies built on the well-established policy framework                
and consensus forecast inferences in normal times.  
 
On the DSGE models, they investigated the effects of imposing a strong commitment to an accommodative policy in the                   
future and introduced Odyssean forward guidance shocks in the policy rule. They also assume that a monetary policy                  
reaction function derives the path of the federal funds rate when the FOMC makes projections and responds to changing                   
economic conditions over time. Applying the Gurkaynak-Sack-Swanson (GSS) event study technique, they show that              
forward guidance has significant impacts on asset prices, particularly treasury yields in post-GFC. They administer a                
sequence of shocks while modeling Odyssean forward guidance for one year from the present. The results indicate that the                   
market expects that the interest rate deviates from the policy rule at least a quarter in advance. Moreover, the markets                    
anticipate 40 percent of the deviations two to four quarters prior.  
 
Charles Evans viewed that threshold-based forward guidance combined with LSAPs enhanced the financial state and real                
activity as evident from an increased number of purchased durable goods, auto sales, commercial real estate, and housing                  
market data. Offsetting the worldwide and fiscal headwinds faced during and in the aftermath of the GFC, the marginal                   
benefits of threshold-based forward guidance was large given that the US economy was far from reaching its dual                  
mandate objectives. ​Citing his own original proposal of 7/3 percent - bright-line economic thresholds rule, as conservative                 
due to inflationary pressures, Charles Evans’ proposed new thresholds of 6.5/2.5 percent, known as the Evans Rule. He                  
regarded that it would be premature to lower or end the accommodation and its positive effects simply because the                   
unemployment rate hit 6.9 percent - a level greater than the rate linked with maximum employment at that time. We can                     
attribute this reasoning to the macro-model FRB/US simulations wherein keeping the federal funds rate at ZLB until the                  
unemployment rate is at least 6.5 percent causes minimal risks of inflation. Evans initially reckoned the 3 percent inflation                   
threshold as a “symmetric and reasonable treatment” for the 2 percent inflation target and is consistent with the volatility                   
in the inflation rate and the bands of uncertainty surrounding its forecasts. The simulations suggest that the economy is                   
more likely to first cross the unemployment rate threshold of 6.5 percent before the PCE inflation rate spikes to a                    
moderate level of 2.5 percent. Furthermore, he proposed utilizing the forecast of personal consumption expenditures price                
index, rather than the actual PCE inflation rate to prevent triggering a reaction in the policy rate due to transitory swings in                      
prices of volatile goods such as food, oil, etc. Finally, PCE inflation rate forecasts encompass various economic                 
phenomena ranging from inflationary expectations to cost pressures - these are the variables that affect the inflation rate                  
outlook before they are evident in the actual data on PCE inflation. Therefore, he reckoned the ex-ante measures as a more                     
appropriate safety than a backward-looking measure.  
 
Whilst the prevalent discussion on forward guidance encompasses an inflation “ceiling,” Zaman & Knotek (2013)               
incorporate an inflation “floor.” Essentially, an inflation floor commits not to raise the target federal funds rate if the                   
inflation rate lies below a pre-specified value, albeit the unemployment rate crosses its threshold. They use a Bayesian                  
Vector Autoregression (BVAR) to scrutinize when the thresholds of projected inflation and unemployment rates could be                
breached. It encompasses seven variables that include the federal funds rate, measures of real activity such as real GDP,                   
two measures of inflation - core and total PCE, supply-side variables - unit labor cost, and unemployment rate.  
 
Their model suggests one possible outcome that the unemployment rate would cross the threshold by 2015-Q3 before the                  
actual PCE inflation rate crosses the projected inflation rate threshold. The point forecast of each variable is the mean of                    
different simulated forecast paths of that variable. Besides a point forecast, they predict a joint probability distribution of a                   
spectrum of possible outcomes which display that there is more than 50 percent chance that at least one threshold will be                     
breached in 2015-Q1. The alternative forecasts account for the uncertainty inherent in the modal outlook as they recognize                  
different possible timings when the thresholds might be breached. Post model estimation, they simulate various ex-ante                
paths of the variables included in the model. Each simulation demonstrates distinct shocks that might occur in the future,                   
alongside the realized values from the estimated distribution of coefficients. Their model depicts that when the inflation                 
rate floor is 1.5 percent, then the point wherein both floors satisfy and at least one threshold crosses - delays by one                      
quarter. This contrasts with an inflation rate floor of 1.75, in which the delay is as long as four quarters. Therefore, the                      
liftoff of the federal funds rate from the ZLB may be substantially delayed depending on the selected rate of the inflation                     
floor.  
 
Next, I have elaborated the reasons that the unemployment rate and inflation rate are inadequate (and possibly                 
inappropriate) variables that formulate the Evan’s Rule.  
 
Biases and Limitations in the Measures of Labor Utilization and Inflation 
 
The unemployment rate, which is calculated from the data collected in the Consumer Population Survey, is rife with                  
multiple inconsistencies. Firstly, as Hamilton and Ahn (2020) explained, the unemployment rate and the labor force                
participation rate have rotation bias: in rotation 1, households are visited for the first time, while in rotation 2, they are                     
interviewed for the second time. Likewise, they are interviewed multiple times until the eighth rotation. The BLS uses                  
data from all the eight rotations to calculate the unemployment rate for a specific month. However, the unemployment rate                   
numbers across different rotations vary significantly. This will negatively impact any inference that we conclude from the                 
CPS data. To exemplify, if we collect data from a certain fixed sample of people over periods, then we will notice that the                       
percentage of people employed over time increases i.e. the outflow from unemployment outpaces the inflows.  
 
Secondly, the missing observations documented over time are not random. The frequency at which households in the CPS                  
have been answering all the questions has dwindled. Typically, the BLS calculates the unemployment rate statistics by                 
compiling data only from those people who provide data for a given month. However, the CPS estimates will be biased if                     
the missing observations are not randomly chosen from the population i.e. the dataset is missing not at random (MNAR).                   
In that case, we cannot use maximum likelihood estimation and multiple imputations as they assume that the data is at                    
least missing at random (MAR).  
 
Thirdly, there is a mismatch between the length of a job search that an individual reports in a month and the labor force                       
status that the same individual provides in the previous month. Furthermore, the reported length of unemployment is                 
incompatible with unemployment hazard rates. For instance, from the BLS data, there was a 38 percent probability of an                   
unemployed individual to exit unemployment in the next month in 2011, whereas the probability amongst those                
unemployed for greater than six months was 31 percent. Hence, although we expect that the mean length of                  
unemployment would be 3 months, the BLS noted that the mean unemployment duration amongst unemployed was 40                 
weeks or 10 months, starkly diverging from the forecasts based on the hazards reported. Lastly, due to differential                  
preferences, people report certain numbers differently than others. To elaborate, more people on an average state that they                  
have been searching for jobs for 6 months (or 24 weeks), than other people who have been searching for jobs for 23                      
weeks. Moreover, people are less likely to report an odd number of weeks for unemployed duration than an even number                    
of weeks for the same. 
 
Just as there are inherent flaws in utilizing the unemployment rates as a benchmark for labor utilization, the inflation rate                    
is problematic. Projected values of percent change in CPI is very volatile in the short-run due to transitory shocks such as                     
changes in oil price. Therefore, crossing the inflation threshold is very likely, albeit, unemployment may still be very                  
elevated. As a corollary, a higher inflation target would warrant more favorable unemployment conditions, than those                
when the inflation threshold is lower. Alternatively, the Fed may decide to communicate to the public why it is not viable                     
to raise the federal funds rate target, notwithstanding the timing of the breach of the inflation threshold. This will make the                     
Fed’s actions less credible to the public - as the public had believed that crossing the inflation threshold would stimulate                    
the Fed would tighten the federal funds rate, albeit it didn’t. To overcome the issue, the Fed may set a higher threshold for                       
inflation; however, this risks the chance that the Fed will not tighten the policy when inflation is very persistent. In that                     
case, the Fed may decide to base its threshold contingent upon ex-ante inflation levels between one and two years ahead.                    
But this becomes fraught with problems if the Fed’s inflation projections substantially deviate from those of the private                  
sector, risking its credibility. 
 
Instead of having a pre-specified unemployment threshold of 6.5 percent, using a range threshold would be apt, “at least                   
as long as the unemployment rate” surpasses the threshold. This implies that the Fed would welcome unemployment                 
levels even when it is below 6.5 percent. Expectations also play a major role - if the Fed announces a policy threshold,                      
but market participants don’t materially alter their expectations on knowing the date when the Fed will lift off from its                    
current low-interest rate, then the stimulus would not be very efficacious. This is because if the market participants                  
anticipate protracted periods of the target federal funds rate at zero lower bound and tightening conditions even when the                   
Fed has changed its preferences in the medium run, then stimulus will not have the desired expansionary effect. On the                    
other hand, if FG enables market participants to better understand the FOMC’s reaction function, such that they revise                  
their expectations of medium and long term interest rates, aligning with the Fed’s future trajectory of short term rates, then                    
the markets will become stable. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a drawback of using the unemployment rate as a measure of slack in the economy. The FRB/US                    
stochastic simulations omit the measurement uncertainty, which is very telling as the natural rate of unemployment is                 
unobserved and is with a degree of uncertainty. If policymakers underestimate the natural rate of unemployment, then they                  
will view that the economy has more slack than is actually, unwittingly overshooting the accommodative monetary policy                 
stance for longer than necessary, spiking inflation. This is germane as policymakers consider the natural rate of                 
unemployment when setting the threshold for the unemployment rate. Particularly, if the inflation expectations are not                
firmly anchored, then overestimating slack in the labor market will cause measurement error and undermine the FOMC’s                 
credibility. Thus, market participants mark up their inflation expectations in the long run.  
 
Forward Guidance through FOMC’s statements should explicitly outline in the escape clause that the numbers are                
conservative thresholds and not triggers i.e. the FOMC may disregard the established thresholds (and continue to keep the                  
federal funds rate ​low) if economic and financial conditions are unstable, even if the thresholds are breached. On   f r− f                 
the flipside, the FOMC may decide to lift off the policy rates even before crossing the threshold when the economy is                     
rebounding faster than expected. The statements should also specify a monetary policy reaction function in place on which                  
​will begin to rise from the ZLB. The strongest policy accommodation occurs when a rule includes the inertialf rf                    
behavior than without it.  
 
The Taylor rule is: .5 (π ) .5 (y )Rt
T = rt
LR + πt + 0 t − π* + 0 t − yt
P  
The inertial Taylor rule is: .5 (π ) .5 (y )]Rt
I = 0.85 R .15 [rt−1 + 0 t
LR + πt + 0 t − π* + 0 t − yt
P  
 
Here, and ​are the nominal federal funds rate characterized by the Taylor rule and inertial Taylor rule, respectively. Rt
T  Rt
I                  
​is the long run level of neutral inflation-adjusted federal funds rate, which we expect on average to be consistent with rt
LR                     
the 2 percent inflation rate and maximum output produced when resources are fully utilized. is the 4-quarter moving              πt     
average price inflation for quarter ​t, ​and is the 2 percent target inflation rate. and are ​the logs of real GDP and       π*        yt  yt
P        
potential GDP, respectively, in quarter ​t. and ​are the inflation and resource utilization gaps,      π )  ( t − π*  y )  ( t − yt
P        
respectively. The advantage of the inertial Taylor rule is that it generates an outcome similar to the one without the inertial                     
behavior, but with a gentler slope - it damps the volatility in the short term . Without inertia, ​the federal funds rate               f rf         
moves immediately without indicating the direction of its movement.  
 
The Taylor rule’s intercept is the medium term natural rate of interest Therefore, the Taylor Rule suggests            .  − rt
LR + πt      
that the ​unrate ​threshold at which ​rises above the ZLB hinges on the estimate of the natural rate of interest. Liftoff      f rf                 
will happen at a lower ​unrate ​if the natural interest rate lowers. Forward Guidance will be stimulative if the market                    
participants’ expectations alter when the FOMC announces how ​would change when the thresholds breach. Without        f rf         
changes in expectations of the public, and without clarifying the post-threshold reaction function, the desired stimulative                
effect of the thresholds will wane.  
 
Currently, the FOMC measures inflation through the rate of change of price index for the total personal consumption                  
expenditure (PCE). However, on a year-to-year basis, the total PCE is extremely volatile. Hence, we should consider                 
alternative methods that reweigh the components of the index to discriminate transitory from persistent movements and                
lower measured inflation’s variance. One variable is the nominal wage growth ​measured through           ciwag_rate,− e    
Employee Compensation Index (ECI), and the other is the prime-age employment to population ratio It ​is a              pop.  − e    
function of ​unrate:  
pop labor force participation rate 1 nemployment rate)  e =  × ( − u
 
Establishing the Thresholds of ​eciwag_rate​ and ​epop 
 
In order to establish an ​epop ​threshold in the FRB/US model, I had to find a value of ​epop ​that corresponds to the 6.5                        
percent level of ​unrate. ​The analysis encompasses monthly frequencies of the two time series from January 1, 1990 to                   
June 1, 2012. The indicates a strong negative correlation, which we expect. Before    orr(epop , unrate ) .95  c t  t =  − 0          
regressing ​epop ​against ​unrate, ​I have checked for stationarity of the series as shown in table 1. Here, the null hypothesis                     
is that a series has unit root or is non-stationary. 
 
Variable p-value Inference 
pope  .7896  0 ail to reject H > non tationary series  f 0 =  − s
nrateu  .1565  0 ail to reject H > on stationary series  f 0 = n −  
  epopΔ  .0001  0 eject H > stationary series  r 0 =  
 Δunrate  .0082  0 eject H > stationary series  r 0 =  
 
Table 1: Test for Stationarity for labor utilization variables 
 
The large p-values indicate that both ​epop ​and ​unrate ​have root, and thus, should be differenced before conducting further                   
analysis. Furthermore, figure 1 indicates that they are graphically autocorrelated as the spikes gradually diminish within                
the significance bounds due to trends in ​epop ​and ​unrate. 
 
  
Figure 1: ACF and PACF plots of epop (above) and epop (below) 
 
Each of these variables don’t have constant mean and constant variance i.e they don’t exhibit mean reversion and have                   
stochastic trends. Figure 2 shows the graph of the differenced ​unrate ​and ​epop, ​also called ​(or and               nrate_dif fu   unrate)  Δ  
  ​(or respectively, which also indicate the absence of unit root.pop_dif fe epop)  Δ  
 
 Figure 2: Time series of the first differenced unrate and epop are stationary 
 
I have regressed onto to generate the comparable value of ​epop ​for an ​unrate ​of 6.5 percent i.e. I will   epopΔ  unrateΔ                 
estimate  for a given level of .pope thesh nrateu thresh  
 
M1)         Δepop .0116 .5329 Δunrate                 Adjusted R .225  ( =  − 0 − 0 2 = 0
                   (0.009)        (0.061)   
 
is significant at the 0.05 significance level. I have rewritten the equation to incorporate the ​unrate ​threshold:unrateΔ  
pop pop  .0116 .5329 (unrate nrate )   e t − e thresh =  − 0 − 0 t − u thresh
 
Inputting all the values of and from the series will yield a range of values of For example, when     pope t  nrateu t            pop .  e thresh    
 and  and  then:pop 0.2e 1990/01 = 8 nrate .4,u 1990/01 = 5 nrate .5,u thresh = 6  
 
0.2 pop  .0116 .5329 (5.4 .5) > epop 79.62541.  8 − e thresh =  − 0 − 0 − 6 =  thresh =  
 
The descriptive statistics of shows that an ideal range of An alternative way to    pope thresh        pop 78.39, 81.07).  e thresh = (      
estimate would be via a leveled regression of ​epop ​onto ​unrate. Generally, OLS on variables with stochastic pope thresh                  
trend will yield misleading (spurious regression) results as OLS relies on the assumption that observations are ​i.i.d, ​which                  
is not the case with ​epop ​and ​unrate. ​Furthermore, the t-statistic of these regressors are no longer normally distributed,                   
even for large samples. As a corollary, standard hypothesis tests are no longer valid for non-normal distributions.                 
However, the cointegration tests below show that we can regress the levelled values of ​epop ​on ​lur ​without introducing                   
biases and inferential problems as both the variables share a common stochastic trend. Cointegration analysis enables us to                  
examine the long-run linkages among the economic variables, considering the adjustments in the short-run to deviations                
from the equilibrium in the long run. So, I have performed the Johansen cointegration test to establish a long run                    
relationship. This implies that we can assume a long run relationship in the model even if the series are drifting apart or                      
trending either upwards or downwards. 
 
In the Johansen Cointegration Test:  
 series are not cointegrated i.e there is no cointegration equationH0 :  
 series are cointegratedHA :  
We reject the null hypothesis if the value of the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics are greater than the 0.05 critical                     
value statistics. From the unrestricted cointegration rank test, , implies that there are no hypothesized cointegrating         r = 0         
relations. The trace statistic of critical value statistic. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that there     6.9452  16.1619  1 >  −            
are no cointegrating relations. When there is at most one hypothesized cointegrating relation. The trace test statistic     ,  r = 1             
of critical value statistics, fails to reject the null hypothesis. This signifies that there is at most one .9839 6.6349  0 <  −                  
cointegrating relation between ​epop ​and ​unrate. ​The results from the maximum eigenvalue test also confirms the                
aforementioned conclusion.  
Because ​unrate ​and ​epop ​are cointegrated, they exhibit a long run relationship and can be linearly combined. There exists                   
a linear combination of ​epop ​and ​unrate ​that is stationary. While shocks in the run may affect the movement in the                     
individual series, they would converge with time i.e. they get back to some form of equilibrium in the long run. Albeit                     
both ​unrate ​and ​epop ​are , is enabling us to regress one against another, without generating     (1)  I  pop  unratee − β   (0),  I          
spurious regression results.  
 
M2)           epop 85.6303 .0896 unrate                      Adjusted R .916  ( =  − 1 2 = 0
                                    (0.126)        (0.020)   
 
The coefficients are significant at the 0.05 critical value. Thus,  when  .pop 8.5479  e thesh = 7 nrate .5  u thresh = 6  
 
I have also estimated the thresholds of inflation measures. Currently, the FOMC measures inflation through the rate of                  
change of chain-type price index for the total personal consumption expenditure (PCE), known as ​pce_rate ​in this                 
analysis. However, on a year-to-year basis, the total PCE is extremely volatile. Hence, we should consider alternative                 
methods that reweigh the components of the index to discriminate transitory from persistent movements and lower                
measured inflation’s variance. One variable is the nominal wage growth - ​eciwag_rate, ​measured through Employee               
Compensation Index (ECI). As a better rule-of-thumb forecast of headline inflation, it excludes a fixed percentage of                 
severe price changes.  
 
 Figure 3: Volatile measures of inflation rate relative to wage growth 
 
Although the 4 quarter (or 12 months) moving average of PCE smooths the series and tempers the           ce_rate_ma12,  − p       
volatility arising from the supply shocks such as fluctuations in food, oil and other commodity prices, it is still more                    
volatile than the ECI wage rate. ​The graph in figure 3 above compares the percentage change in 4 quarter moving average                     
PCE: chain-type price index (index with the percent change in PCE rate without the moving average. The     012 00)  2 = 1             
latter is highly volatile as depicted by strong fluctuations in its trend and standard deviation in the descriptive statistics                   
shown below: 
 
 pce_rate eciwag_rate pce_rate_ma12 unrate epop 
Mean 2.380 3.418 2.402 79.054 6.033 
Standard Deviation 1.096 0.878 0.971 1.842 1.618 
Minimum .817  − 0 .368  1 .411  − 0 74.8 3.8 
5%  2 1.920 2.972 1.982 78.6 4.7 
0%  5 2.328 3.387 2.320 79.4 5.6 
5%  7 2.858 3.878 2.829 80.1 6.9 
Maximum 4.958 5.405 4.506 81.9 10 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of inflation and labor utilization variables 
 
The variables that measure inflation and are very autocorrelated as the spikes (figure not shown)     ce_rate− p  ciwag_rate,e           
in the correlogram cross the significance level for five lags, implying that the serial correlations amongst the lags are                   
different from 0. Thus, the variables are non-stationary and I have differenced them to remove the unit roots.  
 
Variable p-value Inference 
ce_ratep  .3767  0 ail to reject H > non tationary series  f 0 =  − s
ciwag_ratee  .4902  0 ail to reject H > on stationary series  f 0 = n −  
Δpce_rate  .0101  0 eject H > stationary series  r 0 =  
Δeciwag_rate  .0006  0 eject H > stationary series  r 0 =  
 
Table 3: Test for Stationarity for inflation rate and wage growth  variables 
 
The non-spurious difference regression of eciwag_rate ​ against pce_rate ​is:Δ Δ  
 
M3)         Δeciwag_rate .0365 .0624 Δpce_rate                Adjusted R .23  ( =  − 0 + 0 2 = 0
                                                        (0.009)        (0.061)   
 
To check if the regression model satisfies the OLS assumptions and that the estimators are the best linear and, I’ve      3M                
constructed the model’s diagnostics plots. Firstly, the null hypothesis of the Harvey - Collier Multiplier test for linearity                  
tests if the regression is linear. From the we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that        alue .178 .05,  p − v = 0 > 0           
is linear. The randomness in the residual plot (not shown) further corroborates the presence of linearity. Secondly,3 M                  
the normal probability plot (not shown) assesses if the residuals visually depart from normality and the model’s good fit                   
implies that the normality assumption is upheld.  
 
Lastly, the White’s test for heteroskedasticity tests if the variance of the residuals are constant or if they change over time.                     
Both the LM - test and F-test p-values of 0.69 and 0.7, respectively are greater than the 0.05 significance level, implying                     
the residuals are homoscedastic. The expected value of the residuals, which is very small and          (ε) .2867 0 ,  E = 5 × 1 −19      
approaches 0. Thus, the model satisfies the Gauss Markov Theorem and we can use ​M2 ​to estimate .                 ciwag_ratee thresh  
Rewriting the equation to incorporate  to estimate  results in the following equation:ce_rate .5p thresh = 2 ciwag_ratee thresh  
 
ciwag_rate ciwag_rate  .0365 .0624 (pce_rate .5)   e t − e thresh =  − 0 + 0 t − 2
 
From the descriptive statistics of , an appropriate range of ciwag_ratee thresh ciwag_rate 3.07, 4.24).  e thresh = (  
 
 pope thresh  ciwag_ratee thresh  
Mean 79.32 3.61 
Standard Deviation 2.67 1.07 
Minimum 2.99  7 .26  1
5%  2 78.39 .07  3
0%  5 79.96 .47  3
5%  7 81.07 .24  4
Maximum 83.35 .53  6
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of epop and eciwag_rate thresholds 
 
I did not construct a leveled regression model because ​pce_rate ​and ​eciwag_rate ​are not cointegrated. When then                ,  r = 0  
the trace statistic of critical value at 0.05 significance level. When the trace statistic of    3.1932 8.3985  2 < 1 −        ,  r = 1     
So, we reject the null hypothesis that there is at most one cointegrating relationship. This signifies that.0524 .63949.  7 < 6                  
pce_rate ​and ​eciwag_rate ​are not related in the long run and the series diverge from one another.  
 
Moreover, widespread misclassification errors in the CPS data have yielded imprecise labor force participation status of                
the survey participants each month (Feng and Hu 2013). The largest errors arise when participants in the survey have                   
been misclassified from unemployed to employed and from unemployed to not in the labor force. It is particularly hard to                    
classify marginally attached workers, such as part-time and discouraged workers. After correcting for errors, they show                
that the official unemployment rate substantially underestimates the true ​unrate ​on average by 2.1 percent from January                 
1996 to August 2011. Furthermore, ​unrate ​is very sensitive to the business cycles as higher ​unrate ​during a downturn                   
underestimate the true level of ​unrate ​by a greater magnitude than in expansionary phases of the business cycle.  
 
Establishing a numerical threshold of ​unrate ​is contingent upon comprehensively understanding the labor force              
participation rate - ​lfpr​. Forecasting ​lfpr ​is hard as it is difficult to distinguish between the change due to cyclical and trend                      
components. I have decomposed ​lfpr ​as an additive model where:  
fpr evel rend easonality oise  l t = l t + t t + s t + n t
 Figure 4: Additive decomposition of lfpr 
 
Monetary policy tools will be efficacious to the point that the patterns in ​lfpr ​are seasonal (or cyclical), whereas fiscal                    
policy would be more appropriate to accommodate the structural patterns affecting ​lfpr. ​As a corollary, ​lfpr ​might spike                  
when ​unrate ​declines. Alternatively, ​unrate ​might reduce albeit minimal growth rate of employment as more people flow                 
from unemployment to non-participation (or not in the labor force). Like ​lfpr, ​the ​unrate ​is a noisy indicator of labor                    
market conditions. Policymakers assign ​unrate ​threshold by gauging the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment              
(NAIRU), also known as the natural rate of unemployment. Mounting evidence ascribes to its decline, consequently,                
diminishing the threshold for ​unrate. ​Furthermore, NAIRU estimates are imprecise and not robust (Staiger, Stock, and                
Watson 1997, 2001; Stock 2001). We acquire NAIRU estimates from those of the Phillips Curve, whose inverse                 
relationship between the unemployment gap and ​pce_rate ​is flattening over time. The OLS regression     nrate_gap − u          
results showcase a weak relationship between ​and the growth rate of PCE - ​pce_rate. ​Both and      nrate_gapu           4M   5  M
represent variations of the Phillips curve.  
 
(M4)      pce_rate .5271 .013 unrate_gap                           Adjusted R .084       = 2 − 0 2 = 0  
                                                (1.929)      (0.304)   
(M5)       eciwag_rate .6518 .0208 unrate_gap                  Adjusted R .362        = 3 − 0 2 = 0   
                                           (0.074)      (− .0208)   0
 
Furthermore, the low correlation between ​unrate ​and ​pce_rate ​of signifies that policymakers should not         .213  − 0      
emphasize strongly on thresholds of ​unrate ​and ​pce_rate. From the correlation matrix, the association between                
eciwag_rate ​and unemployment variables is stronger than that with ​pce_rate, ​signifying that ​eciwag_rate ​is a better                
variable than ​pce_rate. ​For instance:  
andorr(unrate, eciwag_rate) .547 orr(unrate, pce_rate) .213   c  =  − 0 > c  =  − 0   
orr(unrate_gap, eciwag_rate) .606 orr(unrate_gap, pce_rate) .213  c  =  − 0 > c  =  − 0
 
Variable unrate_gap pce_rate unrate eciwag_rate 
unrate_gap 1.000 .304  − 0 .975  0 .606  − 0
pce_rate .304  − 0 1.000 .213  − 0 .568  0
unrate .975  0 .213  − 0 1.000 .547  − 0
eciwag_rate .606  − 0 .568  0 .547  − 0 1.000 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
Moreover, upon decomposing ​pce_rate​, we see a considerable proportion of short-run noise (residual) in the series,                
making it an unreliable time series on which to base the thresholds.  
 
 
Figure 5: Additive Decomposition of  pce_rate 
 
Preliminary estimates on economic variables such as GDP, ​unrate, lfpr, ​etc measure aggregate resources are often subject                 
to revision later once statistical agencies incorporate complete information in published data. Economists extract              
supply-side estimates of NAIRU, total factor productivity, and potential real GDP from these evolving sources of data.                 
Consequently, the output gap, which is the difference between the actual and potential GDP as a percentage of potential                   
GDP, is often revised by large amounts due to the inherent difficulty in forecasting potential GDP. Theoretically, large                  
positive output gaps indicate the economy is exceeding its maximum potential level of output, spiking inflationary                
pressures. With imprecise measures of the output gap, policymakers may fear expected stronger inflation than in actuality                 
and wrongly raise the federal funds rate. Hence, we need to consider a wide array of indicators in assessing the labor                     
market conditions and incorporate their thresholds to determine the timing of the liftoff of ​rff ​from the ZLB.  
 
Subsequently, I’ve discussed the mechanism behind the FRB/US model and investigated the effects of incorporating               
in the FRB/US model, and compared the trajectory of macroeconomic variables with the output fromciwag_ratee thresh                 
the original threshold of ​pce_rate.  
 
A Brief Introduction to the FRB/US Model  
 
FRB/US is a New Keynesian structural policy model that has roughly 375 equations, including 50 “core” stochastic                 
equations. The equations and identities model the variables in sectors such as the labor market, financial sector, foreign                  
activity, business investment, fiscal and monetary policies, etc. The Federal Reserve Board uses it to computationally                
simulate the impact of “what-if” fiscal, monetary and global shocks and project their outcomes on macroeconomic                
variables, given certain assumptions. This paper shows the ex-ante effects of a few shocks under a wide array of                   
alternative policy responses. Firms and households in the model are forward-looking as they formulate their ex-ante                
decisions on sales, income, prices, and financial conditions based on their future expectations of the economy. Instead of                  
reacting instantaneously, they respond gradually as costs of capital installations, contracts, etc create frictions that stagnate                
the process. Thus, markets don’t fully utilize the capital resources and labor as they fail to quickly clear when shocks                    
disturb the economy’s equilibrium.  
 
Expectations play a predominant role in affecting prices in the financial markets, although the model assumes that the                  
financial decisions are insensitive to frictions, due to minuscule transactional costs. Expectations can either have a                
forward-looking model consistent (MCE) solution or a VAR solution to the optimization problems. ​MC expectations are                
rational wherein the firms and households understand the functioning of the economy very well, and expectations are                 
equal to the projections generated by the FRB/US model. ​Alternatively, expectations can be based on a partial                  
understanding of the economy, depicted by a small forecasting model that consists of a few essential macroeconomic                 
variables and their lagged values. Resembling vector autoregression (VAR), hence these expectations are known as VAR                
expectations. Herein, the expectations of firms and households are contingent upon their knowledge of how the three                 
variables interact inflation rate, federal funds rate, and cyclical economic state. These expectations ​have a −              
backward-looking representation as follows: 
XY t = ∑
n  1
i=no
βi t−i  
 vector of variables, coefficient matrices,  expectation of a variable.X t =  βi =  Y t =  
 
In the FRB/US model, inflation, which is derived from a variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, is very slow to                     
adjust. It is based on the historical and projected inflation, alongside the expected resource utilization and the markup of                   
prices over trend costs of labor. The firms strive to pay the wages that equate to the marginal product and price their final                       
goods and services as a markup over the trend unit input costs. Yet, labor costs, among other factors, are harbingers as                     
they create the friction that curtails the speed at which prices and wages adjust to shifts in supply and demand. FRB/US                     
equations incorporate this “sticky-price” nature to govern the inflation rate’s reaction when economic conditions change.               
Consequently, changes in the short-term nominal interest rates temporarily influence the real interest rates, affecting real                
prices and yields on various securities, which indirectly impact economic growth. The short-run frictions hinder the labor                 
market to be in equilibrium. In that case, wage and price inflation are susceptible to increase when and to                 nrate airu,u < n    
reduce when . However, other factors such as movements in energy and commodity prices, supply shocks nrate airuu > n               
may alter wage and price inflation changes.  
 
The FRB/US simulations that I have constructed consists of thresholds of only, and not ​epop. ​In order to           ciwag_ratee         
establish thresholds of In the model, I had to alter the existing equations and add a few new variables. The   ciwag_ratee                   
variables that affect the threshold-based policies are ​dmptunrate ​and ​dmptpi the monetary policy indicators of         −      
unemployment and PCE inflation rates, respectively. I replaced ​dmptpi with ​dmpteci the monetary policy indicators of          −      
the ECI wage rates.  
 
mpteci {eciwag_rate eciwag_rate }  d = 1 >  thresh  2
mptunrate {unrate unrate }  d = 1 >  thresh
 
These alterations will also affect the policy rule for calculating the federal funds rate, the various monetary policy reaction                   
functions such as the Taylor and the inertial Taylor rule.  
 
Adding these variables will affect ​dmptrsh - ​switch variables for monetary policy.  
mptrsh {∃ a threshold}  d = 1 :  
So, 1 ​delays the liftoff of the federal funds rate from the ZLB until either ​unrate ​falls below the critical rate mpteci  d =                    
, ​or ​eciwag_rate ​rises above the threshold . ​Other endogenous trigger variables that arenrate− u thresh       ciwag_rate− e thresh        
affected are: 
 
mptmax max (dmptunrate, dmpteci).  d =    
Thus,  ​when either  ​or  ​is breached.mptmax  ,d = 1 nrateu thresh ciwag_ratee thresh   
2 ​I acquired the data on the ECI wage growth (as forecasted in 2012) from the ​Greenbooks Datasets​.  
 .mptr max (dmptmax, dmpteci )  d =   t−1   
So,​ dmptr ​is initially 0 and remains at that value until either one of the thresholds is crossed, after which it equals to 1.  
 
 
Results of the FRB/US Simulations with ​eciwag_rate ​and ​pce_rate ​Thresholds 
 
In all the graphs, I have simulated and compared the impact of different macroeconomic shocks on the path of the VAR                     3
expectations from 2012Q3 to 2017Q4, keeping the unemployment rate threshold at 6.5 percent. Each of the graphs, that                  
show the impulse response functions, has three trajectories:  
1. Consensus baseline: which is the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) forecasts; 
2. Projected PCE inflation rate threshold which is currently adopted under Evan’s Rulece_rate .5%,  − p thresh = 2  
3. ECI wage rate threshold ciwag_rate .5%.  − e thresh = 3
 
The ECI wage rate is the annualized growth rate of hourly compensation, measured through the employment cost index,                  
whose equation is implicitly derived from the model of bargaining over the real wage. Based on implicit and explicit                   
multi-period contracts, wages are less flexible than prices they gradually adjust to their equilibrium level. In periods of        −           
high ​unrate, ​workers’ bargaining power recedes relative to periods of low ​unrate, ​diminishing their ability to demand                 
higher wages.  
 
The first simulation measures the impact of a strong negative aggregate demand shock. In both , and               ce_rate .5  p thresh = 2   
I have assumed that the Taylor rule monetary policy reaction function prescribes theciwag_rate .5,  e thresh = 3            f f tay,  − r   
path of the federal funds rate. In the former case, I have activated the fiscal policy that adjusts the tax rates such that the                        
ratio of the federal government's surplus to GDP gradually stabilizes at a specified value In the latter case, I             fpsrp .  − d = 1      
have activated the fiscal policy that makes no adjustments and is suitable in the short-run only In both cases, I               fpex .  − d = 1     
have inputted the values of the shock derived from the residuals of the equations for 2008Q4 to 2009Q3 that are given in                      
the FRB/US model itself.  
 
In the first case, the federal funds rate lifted off from the ZLB in ~2016Q2, which is a delay of approximately two quarters                       
from the baseline case, where the FOMC lifted off the policy rates in 2015Q3. In the third case, ,                  ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3  
the delay is further prolonged to 2017Q1. As opposed to the path in the Evan’s Rule, wherein ​ffr ​steeply rises, ​ffr                     
gradually increases. The year to year percent change in the real GDP plummets due to the strong negative AD shock in                     
2012-2013, before reaching levels comparable to those in the baseline. The shock also increases the unemployment rate                 
from 8 to 9.6 percent in its peak in 2013Q1; and consequently diminishes the employment to population rationrate,− u                   
3 ​I constructed impulse response function graphs from FRB/US simulations  in EViews, and the results are in the Appendix. 
to 0.572. The 10-year treasury yield PCE inflation rate core PCE rate , andpop− e        g10,  − r   ce_rate,− p    orepce_rate− c   
the ECI wage rate , also remain below their baseline forecasts, which is consistent with the usual   ciwag_rate− e              
macroeconomic theory. Lower AD generates lower output as the consumers’ demand for goods and services diminishes.                
As a corollary, firms don’t have to hire new workers, and could possibly fire a few of their existing workers, raising the                      
unemployment rate. Moreover, falling aggregate demand may contract the demand for the US treasuries of varying                
maturities, including the 10-year Treasury. A depressed demand may ​diminish the price of the security, raising ​rg10 ​as                  
price and yields are inversely correlated. Since the rise in ​rg10 ​affects long-term fixed rates such as the 10-year mortgage                    
rate, housing becomes less affordable for consumers. Thus further diminishes the consumer demand which composes of                
~70 percent of the US gross domestic product.  
 
The second set of graphs calibrate the impact of a transient $20/barrel increase in oil prices. In both the scenarios, I have                      
assumed that the federal funds rate adheres to the Taylor rule after crossing ​and . ​Setting             ciwag_ratee thresh   ce_ratep thresh   
, I have set the fiscal policy to adjust the tax trends in a way that stabilizes the ratio of government debt tofpdbt  d = 1                        
GDP in both the cases. The graphs depict a decline in the real GDP by ~1.8 percent from the peak as reached in the                        
consensus baseline, but ​rgdpch ​declines more under Evans Rule 2.0 than in the currently established rule. Unlike                 
pce_rate, corepce_rate ​doesn’t fluctuate very much and is less volatile as it excludes the price of food and energy,                   
including oil. Rising oil prices feed directly into upsurging prices of gasoline oil, diesel, and other forms of energy. These                    
raise the utilities costs for both consumers and producers, denting the profit margins. Thus, workers demand higher wages,                  
but because wages are sticky and adjust more slowly than prices, real wages fall, depressing the consumer demand for                   
goods. As consumption constitutes 70 percent of the GDP, its decline also reduces ​rgdpch, ​which, from the graph, is                   
stronger when . pce_rate ​under the wage rate threshold is about 0.4 percent higher from the eciwag_rate .5%   thresh = 3                
baseline when oil prices in 2012, before plunging and converging at 1.45 percent in 2017-Q4. ​ffr ​lifts from the ZLB much                     
sooner in 2014-Q1 than that in the baseline case, while ​ffr ​lifts in 2014Q3 when not only because of               ce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2     
mounting current inflationary trends, but also because of rising inflation expectations. As the transitory weakness in the                 
aggregate spending propels the Fed to stabilize the disequilibrium, it starts to lower the pace of the hike after 2016-Q3                    
under , while it lessens the policy rate from 3.25 to 2.75 percent in 2017-Q4 underce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2                
. Seeing that both the inflation rates become close to the baseline after one year, the decline inciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3                   
the ​ffr ​ is meant to offset the contractionary disturbances due to the spike in oil prices.  
 
Another negative supply-side shock is a lower labor force participation rate As in the case of the negative oil          fpr.  − l         
shock, ​ffr ​lifts early although the slope is less steep. Again, the federal funds rate follows the prescriptions of the Taylor                     
rule after the threshold is breached. Whilst ​unrate ​in the current PCE inflation threshold case appears to move parallely                   
with ​unrate ​from the consensus baseline case, the respective ​epop paths tend to diverge. ​unrate ​is lower from the baseline                    
for two years from 2012Q2 until 2014Q2 from ~8.2 to 6 percent in both the thresholds. From 2014Q3, the decline in                     
unrate ​diminishes when the economy follows the ECI wage rate threshold. In both the thresholds, ​eciwag_rate ​is                 
generally higher and ​pce_rate ​is lower. Historically, lower ​unrate ​is associated with ascending wages as a deficit of                  
workers in the firms cause firms to raise wages to attract qualified workers and satisfy the consumer demand, typically                   
evident in a tight labor market. However, quite bizarrely, as also observed in the oil shock, the forecasts of ​rg10 ​fluctuate                     
(more than usual) like waves from 2015Q4 to 2016Q4. 
 
Next, I have quantified the effects of unanchored inflation expectations under the inertial Taylor rule when              f f intay,  − r  
, and the Taylor rule without the inertial behavior when I have changedce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2           ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3    
the 10-years expected PCE price inflation (from the Survey of Professional Forecasters) to deviate from its current           tr,− p       
level by 5 percent; implying that the long-run inflation rate has significantly responded to new information and market                  
surprises. If the inflation expectations were anchored, then over time. Due to the inertial nature of the policy        ptr  Δ = 0           
reaction function, ​ffr ​stays in the ZLB for a quarter longer than in the original Evan’s Rule, than the proposed rule. Here,                      
the liftoff occurs in 2014Q1 and shoots to 4 percent in 2017Q4 which contrasts with the slow rise in ​ffr ​to 2.8 percent                       
when the inertial behavior guides the rates. Just as in all the previous simulations, the percent change in the real GDP                     
under both thresholds is still lower than those in the consensus baseline scenario.  
 
The fifth simulation assesses the influence of the Taylor rule with the unemployment gap monetary policy reaction                 
function  after both the thresholds are breached, keeping other model specifications constant.f f tlr,− r   
 
The Taylor rule with unemployment gap is: .375 π .1 (unrate airu )Rt
T = rt
LR + πt + 0 t − 0.5 π* + 1 t − n t  
 
This version of Taylor rule calculates the federal funds rate by adding the equilibrium real funds rate with the four-quarter                    
moving average of ex-post inflation rate. Then, we adjust this value since the actual inflation rate deviates from the                − πt    
target rate , and the unemployment rate deviates from the natural rate of unemployment Here, ​ffr ​rise in  − π*            airu .  − n      
2015Q4 in all three cases. ​rgdpch ​is lower in both the threshold conditions than in the baseline until 2016-Q2 Albeit the                     
real GDP growth rate is maximum for up to two quarters from 2015-Q2 at 3.6 percent, the timing and of the peak is                       
slightly variant in either of the threshold conditions. Under both the thresholds, ​rgdpch ​reaches the apex at 3.5 percent in                    
2017-Q1 and then tails off. ​eciwag_rate ​and ​epop ​rise rapidly under both the current and proposed Evan’s Rule. Also,                   
there is a minuscule difference in the trajectory of the inflation variables in both thresholds, presumably because they lift                   
from the ZLB around the same time. There is a burgeoning gap in the paths of the 10-year treasury yields - the yields from                        
both the thresholds are relatively low than those from the baseline, and the rate (when PCE threshold is 2.5%) is slightly                     
lower than when . It appears that the demand for long term treasuries had considerably risen   ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3              
post-2012, as that drives the price up, lowering the yields. The unemployment rates from both the thresholds are much                   
lower, reaching ~4% in 2017-Q4, as opposed to the baseline level of ~5.5% in the same time. Consequently, the ​epop ​is                     
higher under both the simulations.  
 
The sixth simulation is based on the forward-looking model consistent expectations (MCE). Here, the coefficient values                
are based on the discounting weights. I have considered that all asset pricing, wages, and price equations have MC                   
solutions. ​I modeled the impact of a 50 bps hike in the ​ffr ​wherein the FOMC adheres to the Taylor Rule and inertial                       
Taylor rule under only. This lifts the ​ffr ​from the ZLB in 2012-Q2, but under the Taylor rule only,   ce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2                 
ffr ​soars to 1.8 percent in 2013-Q3, before plunging downwards in a parabolic trajectory to -40 pbs. This (unattainable)                   
monetary policy is a reaction to offset the contractionary economy as a result of the premature hike lower ​rgdpch,                 −    
higher ​unrate, ​depressed inflation rates and soaring ​rg10. ​Although, ​ffr ​under the inertial behavior rises relatively to 0.62                  
percent, after which it falls to -0.1 percent in 2015-Q4 and then rises. This premature hike in 2012 diminishes ​rgdpch                    
considerably, raising ​unrate ​at the apex of 8.45 percent under the Taylor rule. The worsened job market shrinks the                   
purchasing power of consumers, who now have lower disposable income, lowering the inflation rates and ​eciwag_rate.                
For example ​pce_rate ​dramatically fell from 1.75 percent in 2013-Q1 to 0.8 percent in 2017-Q4. In all these graphs, the                    
macroeconomic variables without the inertial behavior deviate considerably than seen in the inertial behavior and               
consensus baseline. 
 
Then, I modeled the simulated paths of the variables under the optimal control policy and contrasted the results from the                    
SEP-consistent baseline forecasts. ​OC Policy consists of solving a large scale macroeconomic model to calculate the                
trajectory of the federal funds rate that minimizes the inflation and unemployment rate deviations from their respective                 
targets. In this approach, the Fed uses choses the level of federal funds rate such that the unemployment and inflation rate                     
targets are fulfilled. Policymakers keep the interest rates low as long as the unemployment rate is farther away from its                    
target than inflation is, even if this causes the inflation rate to overshoot its 2 percent objective for some time.  
 
The seventh simulation checks how the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) baseline forecast would change if the                 
FOMC selects the trajectory of the federal funds rate set by the optimal control (OC) method to minimize a quadratic loss                     
function. The loss function’s role is to penalize equally weighted squared deviations of the inflation rate from its 2 percent                    
target, squared deviations of the unemployment rate from its natural rate, and squared quarterly changes in the federal                  
funds rate.  
 
.99  (w  (π ) (u )  (Δr ) )LO = ∑
T
t=0
0 t π t − 2
2 + wu t − u*
2 + wr t
2  
 
Agents following the model consistent (MC) expectations in the SEP baseline assume that the federal funds rate initially                  
adheres to a baseline path; thus they accordingly anchor their baseline expectations. When the OC simulation starts, the                  
agents revise their expectations such that they are consistent with the path that the federal funds rate takes under optimal                    
control. Therefore, the policy actions announced are fully credible and agents have rational expectations. Running the                
simulation with ZLB, I added a penalty term to the loss function and assumed unequal weights on the three terms of the                      
loss function in the OC policy simulation and Under the OC policy, ​ffr ​rises from the ZLB in      w ,  − wπ =  u = 1  0.  wr = 1           
2016Q1, a quarter away from the liftoff proposed under the consensus baseline scenario. A later liftoff timing contributes                  
to an increase in the GDP growth rate relative to the baseline case by ~0.4 percent. Consequently, ​unrate ​diminishes faster                    
and reaches at 4.7 percent in 2017Q4 in the former, while it is still 5.5 percent in the latter. A lower ​unrate ​and higher                        
rgdpch ​creates inflationary pressures, spiraling both the core PCE and overall PCE inflation rates by ~0.4 percent. The                  
ECI wage rate robustly rises by ~0.6 percent when compared to the ECI wage rate in the baseline scenario, most likely                     
because a tight labor market incentivizes workers to raise hourly compensation to attract more workers. Finally, ​rg10 ​is                  
lower than its movement in the consensus baseline simulation by ~0.4 percent. We can attribute this to the rising demand                    
of treasuries which raises the prices, thereby, pushing the yields down. As a feedback mechanism, lower yields drive                  
down the long term mortgages and other commercial rates, enticing consumers to refinance their existing loans/mortgages                
and boost the aggregate demand.  
 
The OC policy doesn’t consider an overly-accommodative policy which may be a harbinger for asset bubbles. If the Fed                   
projects that the economy will function with full capacity by a certain year, then guiding the federal funds rate towards                    
zero might wrongly signal the investors to indulge in excessive risks that may dislocate long-term inflation expectations.                 
Consequently, the Fed will have to aggressively tighten its policy. In this case, the Fed’s policy of keeping the rates at                     
ZLB would be stretched to a limit and a method to depress the short end of the curve could dislocate the longer end.                       
Whereas optimal control simulations are informative, they hinge on a specific type and features of the model chosen, and                   
a range of simplistic yet possibly unrealistic assumptions. So, optimal control policies may not be robust to                 
misspecifications in the model as they are constructed (Williams and Orphanides, 2008). It also ignores uncertainty about                 
the model’s specification. Thus, it would be imprudent to place too much weight on these factors.  
 
OC policy works well when the public’s perceptions match those indicated by rational expectations. However, assuming                
rational expectations, optimal control policy performs poorly in a model wherein the public has imperfect information                
about the state of the economy, and therefore, must learn. Then, their expectations may deviate from those implied by                   
rational expectations, causing the finely - tuned optimal control policy to go astray. Furthermore, if we implicitly assume                  
that inflation expectations will always be well-anchored, then optimal control policy reacts inadequately when inflation is                
very volatile. Resultantly, the inflation rate becomes excessively persistent and deviates considerably from its target.               
William and Orphanides (2008) found that we can make optimal control methods more robust to learning by emphasizing                  
less on the stability of real output and interest rate relative to inflation in the loss function. If the bias present in the                       
weights of the loss function is very large, then the Fed should act as if it assigned weight on the inflation that is ten times                         
more than suggested by the society’s true loss function. Under this biased objective function, the optimal control policy                  
reacts to inflation, performs better when investors are learning in the model, anchoring inflation expectations.  
 
In a nutshell, low weights on unemployment and interest rate deviations from their target stabilize inflation and inflation                  
expectations when investors learn. The OC policy reacts to return inflation back to its target rapidly after the shock.                   
Hence, the public expectations anchor near the target, muting the impact of learning in the economy. In juxtaposition, if                   
the weights on unemployment and interest rate deviations are high, then the OC policy very gradually returns the inflation                   
rate to its target after a shock. These persistent deviations of inflation from its target can confuse the public as they have                      
asymmetric information about the Fed’s objective and the state of the economy.  
 
Thus, I simulated another FRB/US model that shows the paths of the variables under OC policy with reduced weights of                    
unrate ​and ​ffr ​relative to ​pce_rate. and Now, the federal funds rate lifts off six quarters later in      ,  wu = wr = 5  0.  wπ = 1            
2017-Q4, than in the previous case, loosening the monetary policy. Consequently, ​rgdpch ​is also higher, and reaches the                  
peak at 4 percent in 2015-Q3. ​unrate ​falls to 4.6 percent, also increasing ​epop. ​The easing policy also creates inflationary                    
pressures, spiking both ​pce_rate ​and ​corepce_rate, ​but ​eci_wage ​doesn’t significantly rise.  
 
The ninth simulation measures the effects of a few aforementioned demand and supply shocks in the present from                  
2020-Q2 until 2023-Q4. Invoking the Taylor rule in a demand shock, with ​ffr ​already in the ZLB today, the model                    4
projects ​ffr ​to lift-off in 2022-Q1 under and consensus baseline. ​unrate ​reaches ~4 percent       ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3        
under both the thresholds, which is approximately 1 percent below the baseline forecasts. Better labor market conditions                 
heat the economy, raising the inflation rates to their target 2 percent levels by mid-2022. Yet, ​eciwag_rate lags behind                    
and is only able to reach 2.8 percent by 2023-Q4.  
 
In the tenth simulation, I forecasted the influence of a $20/barrel hike in the price of oil. In the wake of mounting                      
inflationary pressures, these lift the ​ffr ​early in 2021-Q3 under both the thresholds. ​unrate ​initially soars at 13 percent in                    
2020, before it descends to 3.75 and 4.05 percent under and , respectively          ce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2  ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3   
in 2023-Q4. Unlike the sluggish pace of wage growth in the demand shock, ​eciwag_rate ​picks up faster, reashing 3.2                   
percent under the PCE inflation threshold at the end of the forecasting period. However, the growth is still tepid at 2.8                     
percent under the alternative threshold condition. We observe similar patterns in another supply shock 2 percent decline              −     
in ​lfpr. ​However, the differential peaks of ​unrate ​observed in the three scenarios reveal inconsistencies. Under                
, ​unrate ​reaches only 6.8 percent as opposed to 10 percent under .ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3             ce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2  
Nonetheless, ​epop ​under both thresholds slump to the floor at ~0.55, when we would expect it to be lower under                    
. ​rg10 ​climbs under and is ~1.6 percent higher than under the alternativece_rate .5%  p thresh = 2     ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3          
threshold, reflecting lower demand for long-term yields. Thus, commercial banks increase long term rates on mortgages,                
auto-loans, credit cards etc, making investment harder, marginally diminishing ​rgdpch ​from 2021-Q3.  
 
The twelfth simulation presents the impact of unanchored inflation expectations, drifting the inflation expectations              
upwards by 2 percent. Invoking the Taylor rule with the unemployment gap, ​ffr ​from both the thresholds climb at                   
2021-Q1 from the ZLB. As observed in previous projections, ​ffr ​rises faster under , tightening             ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3   
the monetary policy. Thus, the inflation rates from the ECI wage rate threshold are lower than those in the PCE rate                     
4 ​I inserted the consensus baseline forecasts from the ​Summary of Economic Projections​ released by the FOMC on June 10, 
2020. 
threshold. Additionally, ​rgdpch ​and ​epop ​under the former grows slower after the rate hike relative to ​rgdpch ​in the latter                    
threshold. Next, I have modeled the paths, separately under the inertial Taylor rule and Taylor rule, keeping the thresholds                   
in place. Most variables behave somewhat similar to the trajectories observed above, save for ​ffr, ​as it lifts a quarter later                     
in 2021-Q1.  
 
Furthermore, I modeled the impulse response functions to reflect the paths of changes in the variables if the Fed adopts a                     
more aggressive stance of the Taylor rule monetary policy by changing its parameters. Roberts and Reifschneider (2006)                 
explored a few proposals to reduce the impact of ZLB on interest rates, and how to affect the investors’ expectations of                     
future monetary policy when ​ffr ​is at ZLB. The Fed is concerned about the ZLB because weak aggregate demand warrants                    
the Fed to lower the short-term interest rates. Coupled with the expectation that the ​ffr ​will remain at low levels until the                      
economy restores to pre-crisis levels, the long-term interest rates also decline, stimulating the aggregate demand.               
However, the Fed is constrained to provide further stimulus via this channel once the ​ffr ​hits ZLB. Nonetheless, the Fed                    
can sway the expectations of future short-term interest rates, for at least the time far into the future until the policy will not                       
be constrained by ZLB. Forward guidance through FOMC’s statements about the future plans for setting the ​ffr ​can                  
influence the investors’ expectations as they observe the historical workings of the Fed’s reactions. Also, the expectations                 
hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates states that the Fed’s influence will alter the real rates on bonds, if the                      
investors deem its statements to be credible, uplifting the sagging economy. This strategy is effective in the FRB/US                  
model as the real long-term interest rates in the present, functioning via the cost of capital, directly affect the current                    
spending, and paths of long-term rates. Moreover, they indirectly affect inflation and real activity in the model as they                   
influence the asset prices and real exchange rates. 
 
Krugman (1998) recommended either to permanently raise the inflation target or do so for a long time given that in recent                     
times, inflation rates have predominantly been below the Fed’s target. In spite of the easing policy, the last time ​pce_rate                    
breached the 2 percent target was in March 2018. Alternatively, Reifschneider and Williams (2000) proposed adopting a                 
more aggressive monetary policy to subdue the detrimental effects of ZLB. I attempted to model this aggressive approach                  
by replacing the current coefficients of output gap and inflation gap, with larger coefficients in      y )  ( t − yt
P −    (π )   t − π* −       
the Taylor rule.  
 
The original Taylor rule is: .5 (π ) .5 (y )Rt
T = rt
LR + πt + 0 t − π* + 0 t − yt
P  
I modified it to and simulated the effects of a strong negative     (π )  (y ), 0}Rt
T = max{ rt
LR + πt + 2 t − π* + 2 t − yt
P           
demand shock. Raising the coefficients each from 0.5 to 2 indicate aggressive response to inflation and output gaps. The                   
max ​function restraints the nominal interest rates to the ZLB. The hypothesis is that this aggressive strategy will lessen       Rt
T             
the public’s expectations about the path of future ​ffr ​and other short-term treasury bills, albeit they are currently nearly 0.                    
Promising an easy policy in the future will raise inflation expectations.  
 
The graphs of the impulse response functions in the fourteenth simulation show the paths of the macroeconomic variables                  
under the original and modified versions of the Taylor when the Fed adopts under ZLB. Under the             ce_rate .5%  p thresh = 2     
modified version, ​ffr ​lifts in 2024-Q2, which is two years later compared to the paths prescribed by the original rule.                    
From 2023-Q3, ​rgdpch ​surpasses the GDP grow​th rate observed under the consensus baseline and the benchmark policy                −
unconstrained standard Taylor rule. The aggressive policy more efficaciously checks the inflation decline, which slumps               
the ​rg10 ​by a greater extent, stimulating the economy. We can attribute the smaller inflation effect to the investors’ beliefs                    
that the Fed when unconstrained, will aggressively seek to anchor the inflation rate to its target rate. As the expected                    
ex-ante inflation rate changes the current ​pce_rate, ​this accommodative mechanism boosts ​pce_rate ​albeit ​ffr ​is bounded                
at 0. Alternatively, ​eciwag_rate ​crosses 3.5 percent in 2026-Q2, evident from the slow and steady adjustments of wages to                   
faster changes in price.  
 
Finally, I simulated the effect of a temporary boost in government spending in the advent of a negative aggregate demand                    
shock provided that the Fed adopts an accommodative monetary transmission channel for prolonged periods. For that, I                 
have assumed that the Fed adheres to the policy paths prescribed the modified Taylor rule described above. Unlike in the                    
previous simulation when ​ffr ​lifted in 2024-Q2, now it lifts early in 2023-Q3. As opposed to the decline of ​unrate ​without                     
the additional government expenditure, the stimulus lowers ​unrate ​by approximately 0.4 percent in the modified version,                
marginally raising ​epop ​as well. ​eciwag_rate, pce_rate ​and ​corepce_rate ​slightly rise as the discretionary fiscal stimulus                
shock raises the fiscal multiplier.  
 
The upside of an aggressive Taylor rule is that the Fed could enforce it even in normal circumstances when the ZLB does                      
not constrain the typical open market operations. Thereby, policymakers would gain credibility and establish a reputation                
of aggressively responding to movements in inflation. The downside is that very likely, agents beyond those in the                  
financial markets (such as households and firms), gradually learn the impact of monetary policy on inflation as they                  
observe the ex-post values, rather than the ex-ante inflation. Hence, if some agents don’t alter their expectations                 
instantaneously after the Fed announces a new policy, but instead rely on the average historical trajectory of the                  
benchmark rates, then the benefits of the announced policies will be substantially curtailed. ​Furthermore, imperfect               
credibility by the investors during ZLB can be problematic as the inflation may overshoot, building up financial risks, and                   
un-anchoring inflation expectations (Brainard 2017). As a corollary, before resorting to new policy regimes, policymakers               
should be thoroughly confident that the proposed changes would work, albeit investors are only partially credible about its                  
functionalities and effectiveness.  
 
 
Why does Tighten the Monetary Policy?ciwag_rate .5%  e thresh = 3  
 
After imposing two supply shocks, a negative aggregate demand shock, unanchored inflation expectations and unexpected               
hike in the federal funds rate, the findings conclude that the ECI wage growth rate of 3.5 percent is still not                     
accommodative enough, and wage growth higher than 3.5 percent may be necessary. This is likely because of the way the                    
equations in the FRB/US model have been formulated with respect to the PCE inflation rate and the variables derived                   
from it, such as the expectations of PCE inflation rate in the next quarter. For instance, the monetary policy reaction                    
functions and the loss function in OC policy consist of an inflation gap based on the PCE inflation rate. One might                     
consider the possibility of incorporating a wage growth gap in the reaction functions, but that would require us to know                    
the target wage growth rate. Besides, we would have to check the feasibility of incorporating ​eciwag_rate ​in those                  
reaction functions as ​eciwag_rate ​is not a proxy variable for ​pce_rate ​and cannot be substituted for ​pce_rate ​without                  
gauging the true relationship between the dependent variable in question and ​eciwag_rate, ​and the biases and errors it                  
produces.  
 
Another potential reason could be the inherent property of price and wage rigidity driving ​eciwag_rate. ​A key mechanism                  
that monetary policy affects the economy is price rigidity. A form of Phillips curve, known as the New Keynesian Phillips                    
Curve (NKPC) explains the linkage between inflation, price rigidity and movements in the real economy as it associates                  
inflation to factors such as production and utilization costs. However, a diverse array of papers have demonstrated that                  
NKPC fails to capture the persistence of inflation, overstating the function of expectations in setting prices; thus prices are                   
excessively rigid. A model that cannot satisfactorily account for inflation’s persistence is of questionable value for                
forecasting. Furthermore, amplifying the magnitude of price rigidity may inadvertently overstate the Fed’s relevance in               
determining real outcomes, possibly distorting the role of monetary policy in macro-stabilization.  
 
Discussion: Should the FOMC Adopt  a Wage Growth Rate Threshold Higher than 3.5 Percent? 
 
The results of the simulations indicate that establishing an ECI wage growth threshold at 3.5 percent generally tightens the                   
monetary policy as the federal funds rate lifts-off earlier than if the PCE inflation rate threshold of 2.5 percent is in place.                      
Hence, should the Fed consider raising the wage growth rate threshold to values greater than 3.5 percent to check if this                     
aggressive stance boosts the sagging economy? In retrospect, the episodes of policy rate hikes from 2015 and the                  
trajectory of labor utilization and price variables suggest that raising the wage growth rate threshold is feasible without                  
instigating fears of overshooting the inflation rate. 
 
In December 2015, the Fed lifted the interest rate by 25 bps from the ZLB for the first time since 2008-Q4, albeit ​unrate                       
was still elevated at 5 percent, and ​pce_rate ​was barely crawling at 0.35 percent. Hiking the policy rates even before the                     
inflation rate picked up steam stands as testimony to the fact that the Fed was unwilling to aggressively experiment with                    
letting ​unrate ​fall even further and give more room for inflationary pressures. Failing to aggressively target a lower ​unrate                   
is a major reason for the anemic growth in wages. Whilst the Fed raised it by another 25 bps after one year in December                        
2016, it lifted the rates seven times, each by a quarter-point within two years in 2017-18.  
Ideally, the Fed should hike the rates only to inhibit the economy from overheating i.e if there are fears that rapid growth                      
and declining unemployment will ignite fast wage growth and overshoot inflation. Nevertheless, no such signs were                
prevalent for the Fed to diagnose the economy with such premature rate hikes. Perhaps, the concerns of the wage-price                   
spiral were high - tighter labor market conditions would increase the bargaining power of laborers as they would be able                    
to demand higher wages and enhanced fringe benefits, spiking inflation as firms would pass on the higher labor costs to                    
the consumers. So, traditionally, the higher labor costs arising due to higher wages are a precursor to inflationary                  
pressures, that the Fed should counteract.  
Theoretically, a wage-price spiral causes workers in full employment to target growth in real wages (wages adjusted for                  
inflation) which equates to productivity growth. Moreover, they can bargain to accommodate their nominal wage demands                
by acquiring wage raises at the rate of inflation in the previous year. When ​unrate ​is greater than NAIRU, then higher                     
unemployment hamstrings them to earn their true aspired real wages; thus workers target real wage growth that falls short                   
of productivity. Alternatively, if ​unrate ​sinks below NAIRU, then workers shoot for higher real wages that outgrow                 
productivity. Whilst unattainable, as productivity is the ceiling on the maximum yield an economy can generate, their                 
nominal wage demand sets in the wage-price spiral in motion workers earn nominal wage hikes, but employers pass          −         
over the higher labor costs to consumers. This offsets (and erodes) the real wage growth, continuing the feedback loop. To                    
break the wage-price spiral, policymakers slow the economy’s pace by indirectly attenuating the bargaining powers of                
workers as ​unrate ​rises.  
Yet, higher ​eciwag_rate ​did not materialize although ​unrate ​dipped below NAIRU as shown from the graph above. We                  
don’t know the ​unrate ​low enough to jump ​eciwag_rate and ​pce_rate. ​Nor do we know the ​unrate ​level for which the                     
pce_rate ​will not just soar but will gain momentum and accelerate if ​unrate ​falls below NAIRU. ​unrate ​breached NAIRU                   
for the first time in January 2017 since December 2007, but paradoxically ​pce_rate ​diminished from 2.01 to 1.53 in June                    
2017, and ​eciwag_rate ​barely budged from 2.38 in January 2017 to 2.61 percent seven months later. Whilst the economy                   
plunged into a cataclysmic wage-price price spiral in the late 1960s and 1970s as prices for consumers surged from 1.6 to                     
13.5 percent, the wage-price spiral is dormant in the 21st century. To corroborate this, the OLS regression on the quarterly                    
data on ​eciwag_rate ​and ​pce_rate ​from March 2002 to June 2020 demonstrated that a 1 percent increase in ​eciwag_rate                   
augments the ​pce_rate ​by merely 0.461 percent, and the p-value was statistically significant. 
ce_rate .6488 .461 eciwag_rate  p = 0 + 0
                   (0.463)           (0.182)   
Given the tenuous connection between wage growth and PCE inflation rate in recent years, it is far-fetched that a                   
wage-price spiral would usher in, making the tightening policy redundant. There are miniscule dangers of overshooting                
inflation in the present day. On the contrary, overshooting inflation should, in fact, be a part of the Fed’s normalization                    
policy, and not a problem to avoid.  
Conclusion 
I have examined the Evan’s Rule in the context of state-based forward guidance that the FOMC adopted in the aftermath                    
of the Global Financial Crisis. After reviewing the drawbacks in the measures of unemployment rate and inflation rate, I                   
proposed an alternative threshold of the ECI wage rate, and calibrated the equivalent to            ciwag_rate  e thresh   
ce_rate .5%.  p thresh = 2  
 
Transforming the standard Taylor rule to an unconstrained version loosens the monetary policy as it prescribes a later                  
liftoff of the federal funds rate from the ZLB. Further research can explore the combination of “lower for longer” (L4L)                    
L4L was an approach proposed by Bernanke et. al (2019) wherein the Fed would keep theciwag_rate .5%.  e thresh > 3                 
rates “lower for longer” when the ZLB is hit. A completely credible L4L policy can extensively ameliorate the constraints                   
imposed by ZLB. Additionally, it diminishes bond yields and increases inflation expectations, which reduce real               
long-term interest rates. Thus, markets are optimistic of ex-ante growth, encouraging consumers and producers to spend                
more during ZLB episodes.  
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The following pages contain the results of the FRB/US Simulations.  
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